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BACKGROUND 
Based on the complaint filed by the trade unions SITRACIMA and SITRACHOI before the 
Commission for Verification of Corporate Codes of Conduct (COVERCO) and other national 
and international stakeholders and before the Fair Labor Association (FLA) under its Third 
Party Complaint procedure, about the possible shutdown of the factory Cimatextiles, S. A. 
("Cimatextiles"), the FLA commissioned COVERCO to perform an independent investigation 
of the factory, which manufactures products for a number of companies, including Liz 
Claiborne, Inc. (LCI), an FLA-affiliated company, and other companies not affiliated with the 
FLA. The investigation began on May 21, 2007 and was expected to last 10 days. However, 
due to a number of extenuating circumstances described in this report, it was necessary to 
extend the investigation until June 28, 2007.  
 
FINDINGS 
Taking into consideration the urgency of the situation, COVERCO used a focused and direct 
approach to guide its fieldwork activities. It gathered evidentiary information to support its 
work. COVERCO identified the key stakeholders and designed a questionnaire for 
management personnel, workers, and supervisors, and conducted follow-up interviews outside 
the plant. COVERCO also cross-referenced information by means of third party interviews. 
 
The key themes identified by COVERCO during the process of the investigation were the 
following: 
 
1. Production and Quality 
2. Closure 
3. Negotiations between the Company and the Trade Unions 
4. Violence 
5. Opposition Groups 
6. Special Case – Gun 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
COVERCO points out that at the beginning of its work, the company was open to requests 
and facilitated access to carry out interviews and review documents. In the final phase, after 
June 12, 2007, the company did not provide information on the compensation payments. 
Proof of this is that even the request by the Ministry of Labor, through the General Labor 
Inspectorate, was addressed with a partial delivery of the required documentation on June 21, 
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2007. The company stated that COVERCO could have access to those documents after the 
General Labor Inspectorate carried out its review. 
 
Consistent with the organization of this Final Report, COVERCO presents the Conclusions 
following the same structure used for the Findings. 
 
1. Production and Quality 
It is evident that the company did not utilize the adequate channels specified in the collective 
bargaining agreement to resolve production and quality problems. 
 
? COVERCO confirmed that the company maintains its production quota. 
? If production problems existed, the company should have utilized the procedures set out in 
the collective bargaining agreement, article 18, regarding Joint Meeting and article 42 on 
production goals. 
? Interviews with workers and the Personnel Chief indicate that Korean employees, 
specifically Mr. Kevin Kim, Chief of Cutting, were responsible for production and quality 
problems. COVERCO did not interview him because he no longer works for the company.  
 
2. Closure 
The national legislation authorizes two modalities that need to be substantiated: 
  
? A partial collective suspension is authorized only when there is “lack of raw material to 
carry out work, provided that it is attributable to the employer, according to a 
determination by the court”, article 70, clause c) of the Labor Code; and, 
? A total collective suspension is authorized only when there is “lack of raw material to 
carry out work, which cannot be attributed to the employer” article 71, clause c) of the 
Labor Code.  
 
In the case of the company, if there was in fact a justified lack of raw material at Cimatextiles 
and, if the company had used the correct procedure, the current collective conflict could have 
been prevented. COVERCO’s analysis is that the procedures utilized should have relied on 
the Collective Bargaining Agreement.  
 
? Call a Joint Meeting to discuss the production problem of the factory, according to article 
18, Joint Meeting.  It will be the invariable norm between the companies and the trade 
unions to resolve every controversy that arises through the Joint Meeting … a) It will meet 
regularly the last Friday of each month, except in urgent cases when it will meet at the 
time of the request to meet by either party; … d) Agreements of the Joint Meeting will be 
effective immediately after the signing of the official document, a copy of which will be 
sent to the General Labor Inspectorate; 
? At that meeting the argument that had to be considered regarded article 56. LABOR 
STABILITY, part a: “In no case will massive dismissals of workers of the company be 
undertaken. It is understood that massive dismissal means when more than 10 workers are 
dismissed in the same calendar month”; and, 
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? Article 42 Production Goals. The companies will explain weekly to the trade unions 
matters related to production goals. 
 
Meanwhile, in the case of the General Labor Inspectorate, it should not have received the 
request for authorization of a “total collective suspension” from Cimatextiles, because the 
company already had been summoned to court and the company had not exhausted internal 
procedures. 
 
It is quite clear that the Trade Union was legally constituted. However, the factory did not 
respect the following aspects of trade union rights: 1) Trade Unions legitimacy and legality to 
negotiate and establish a collective bargaining agreement and 2) The June 5, 2007 Agreement 
infringes on the rights established in the collective bargaining agreement according to Article 
5 re: Trade Unions Acknowledgment. "The company acknowledges the Trade Unions as 
legitimate representatives of the workers in their economical, social, and cultural rights and 
interests and they are compelled to address with their representatives individual or collective 
issues which may occur in the workplace…” Taking into consideration these areas, 
COVERCO’s opinion is that there has been a violation of freedom of association and 
collective bargaining rights.  
 
3. Negotiations 
During negotiations between the company and trade unions, an agreement was reached for 
temporary closure, payment of compensations and commitments to rehire at Cimatextiles 
once operations resumed in September 2007. However, no procedures or systems were put in 
place to guarantee the fulfillment of these agreements. The result has been the partial 
fulfillment of agreements; among them, the calculation of economic benefits. 
 
COVERCO believes that it remains the company's exclusive discretion to determine if there is 
production to justify reactivating operations in September 2007. The agreement did not 
establish a verification system to prove new orders and their corresponding distribution. In 
accord with this norm, it could be interpreted that there is no obligation to legally reactivate 
Cimatextiles. 
 
It is important to note that the agreements did not foresee continuity of employment.  For that 
reason, there is no full guarantee of hiring of workers. Although the agreements were 
guaranteed by Cimatextiles and SITRACIMA, endorsed by the Labor General Inspectorate, 
and have external observers to verify their fulfillment, they are NOT an effective guarantee 
for the reactivation of operations 
 
4. Violence 
An atmosphere of distress came upon workers, some of whom fainted or fell ill, when news of 
factory closures led to disturbances at the factory. The only reported incident of violence was 
regarding a Choishin worker who, while attempting to enter the facility, was pushed by a 
Korean manager. COVERCO investigate the allegation and the incident was confirmed 
through worker interviews. The worker that was pushed, however, refused to be interviewed, 
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probably because the workers continues to work at Choishin and fears possible retaliation 
from management. 
 
5. Parallel groups directly or indirectly organized by the factory 
COVERCO witnessed actions of an opposition group organized by Willard Sanchez, 
Cimatextiles' Personnel Chief, against the activities carried out by the trade union 
SITRACIMA in the days prior to June 5, 2007. COVERCO has evidentiary photo of meetings 
of this group with the Personnel Chief. Given the evidence of interference by the Personnel 
Chief, through the creation of a parallel group, the representative of the General Labor 
Inspectorate verbally warned him about this practice. 
 
COVERCO considers that this group could be used to blame the union if the factory does not 
reopen in September 2007. If the factory does reopen, it will be an organized group within the 
company parallel to the trade union. 
 
6. Special Case 
COVERCO investigated allegations that a Cimatextiles manager carried a gun inside the plant 
to intimidate workers.  COVERCO did not find objective evidence to support this allegation.  
   
RECOMMENDATIONS 
In the interim until September 2007 
? Provide follow-up and verify fulfillment of the correct payment of benefits. 
? Ensure the resolution of specific (workers on maternity leave, breastfeeding, Social 
Security medical suspensions). 
? Provide follow-up and verification of the collective bargaining negotiation process. 
? Create a commission to oversee the process of negotiation of new production contracts for 
the factory. 
 
During the operations' start-up 
? Verify the fulfillment of the preferential hiring agreement of workers registered in the 
Cimatextiles' list. 
? Deliver a joint training program on the fulfillment of labor rights. 
? Verify that the right to freedom of association is being respected and allowed to be 
exercised.  
 
